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Abstract
We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-González [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707]
model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsi-
dies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among
three firms located in different countries. A conflict between stability and efficiency is
likely to occur. When governments cannot subsidize R&D, this conflict will occur if
public spillovers are not very small. However, when governments can subsidize R&D,
the likelihood of a conflict is considerably reduced. Indeed, a conflict will arise only if
public spillovers are very small or quite large.
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1 Introduction
The number of agreements on international research and development (R&D) collabora-
tion has been increasing at an unprecedented rate. For instance, Chesnais (1988) has
reported that among inter-firm agreements in high technology industries in Italy, where
the product markets are characterized by imperfect competition, a large portion were for
R&D collaboration, and more than half were for international collaboration.
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Govern-
ment support for both domestic and international R&D collaboration, including public
investment, subsidy, and antitrust law modification, has also become more frequent.
Goyal andMoraga-González (2001) have analyzed the incentives for R&D collaboration
between horizontally related firms when governments cannot subsidize R&D. They have
basically shown that a conflict between the incentives of firms to collaborate and social
welfare is likely to occur, and will arise if public spillovers from research are not too small.
The purpose of this paper is to go beyond their analysis by allowing (i) governments to
subsidize R&D and (ii) for coalitional deviations in the formation of R&D collaboration
networks. In this paper we address the following questions:
(i) When governments can subsidize R&D, what are the incentives of firms located in
different countries to collaborate and what is the architecture of "stable" networks
of collaboration?
(ii) Do subsidies reconcile individual incentives to collaborate and social welfare?
To answer these questions we develop a four-stage game. In the first stage, three
firms located in different countries form pairwise collaboration links. The purpose of these
collaboration links is to share R&D knowledge about a cost-reducing technology. The
collection of pairwise links between the firms defines a network of international collab-
oration. In the second stage, each government (whose objective is to maximize social
welfare) simultaneously announces its R&D subsidy rates. In the third stage, each firm
chooses independently and simultaneously a level of effort in R&D. In the fourth stage,
firms compete in the product market of a fourth country by setting quantities.
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We will
consider Goyal and Moraga-González model, where government cannot subsidize, as our
benchmark.
1
Hagedoorn (2002), who has provided a survey of empirical work on R&D collaboration among firms,
has also reported that during the 1980s, on average there were an additional 100 collaborative agreements
every year in biotechnology, and over 200 every year in information technologies.
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This assumption is standard in strategic trade policy models (see Brander, 1995) and represents situa-
tions where firms’ home market is small or negligible relative to the size of the relevant market. Examples
are Nokia in Finland, or Samsung in South-Korea.
1
R&D effort of a firm decreases its marginal cost of production. It has also positive
knowledge spillovers on the costs of firms that are linked to the firm that undertakes
R&D effort. It is assumed that the research knowledge of a "direct" collaboration is fully
absorbed, while the research knowledge of a no direct collaboration (indirect collaboration
or no collaboration at all) is partially absorbed (public spillovers).
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long
run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not benefit from altering
the structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability
notion defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no agent
benefits from severing one of their links and no other two agents benefit from adding a link
between them, with one benefiting strictly and the other at least weakly. But, pairwise
stability considers only deviations by at most a pair of agents at a time. It might be that
some group of agents could all be made better off by some complicated reorganization of
their links, which is not accounted for under pairwise stability. The definition of strong
stable networks allows for larger coalitions than just pairs of agents to deviate, and is due
to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). A strongly stable network is a network which
is stable against changes in links by any coalition of agents.
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In a model with three firms
located in different countries, there are four possible network architectures: the complete
network, the star network, the partially connected network, and the empty network. In
the complete network every pair of firms is linked. The star network is a network in which
there is a "hub" firm directly linked to every other firm, while none of the other firms have
a direct link with each other. The partially connected network refers to a configuration
in which two firms are linked while the third firm is isolated. In the empty network there
are no collaboration links.
When governments cannot subsidize R&D, the complete network is always pairwise
stable, while the partially connected network is pairwise stable only for very small public
spillovers. Moreover, the partially connected network is the unique strongly stable network
when spillovers are very small; otherwise, no strongly stable network exists. Indeed, the
complete network is destabilized by coalitional deviations. We say that a network is
strongly efficient if it maximizes the societal welfare defined as the sum of producing
countries’ social welfare. The partially connected network is the strongly efficient network
for very small spillovers; otherwise, the star network is the strongly efficient network.
Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency is likely to occur. This conflict will occur
if public spillovers are not very small.
However, we show that, once governments can subsidize R&D, the likelihood of a
3
Jackson (2003, 2005) provides surveys of models of network formation.
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conflict is considerably reduced. The complete network is always pairwise stable, but it is
never strongly stable. The partially connected network is now pairwise stable when public
spillovers are neither too small nor too large. Notice that the partially connected network is
the strongly efficient network when public spillovers are not too large. Otherwise, the star
network is the strongly efficient network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency
will "only" arise if public spillovers are very small or quite large.
In terms of societal welfare we find that, except if public spillovers are very small,
governments should be allowed for R&D subsidies. Indeed, the societal welfare levels of
stable networks when subsidies are forbidden are dominated by those of stable networks
when subsidies are allowed. Thus, allowing governments to subsidize R&D will not only
reduce the likelihood of a conflict between stability and efficiency, but it will also be
superior in terms of maximizing the societal welfare.
Before presenting the model, it is worth to mention some related literature. Export
subsidies can be used to shift rents strategically between rival firms. See e.g. Brander
(1995). However, such outright subsidies on exports are strictly forbidden by the World
Trade Organization (WTO). In contrast, subsidizing domestic R&D is allowed by the WTO
and, as shown by Spencer and Brander (1983), via such R&D policy a government can
achieve the same strategic outcomes otherwise obtained under direct export subsidies for
firms engaging in international R&D competition. Qiu and Tao (1998) have gone beyond
the analysis of Spencer and Brander (1983) by investigating the optimal government policy
(subsidy or tax) towards international R&D collaboration. They have shown that, with
linear demands, tax is never optimal. Moreover, the optimal policy is subsidy regardless
of the strategic nature (substitute or complement) of the strategy variables. Thus, our
analysis reinforces theories that have provided justification for such government policy
interventions. For general background on R&D cooperation in oligopoly the reader is
directed to Amir (2000), d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien, Muller and Zang
(1992), Katz (1986) and Suzumura (1992).
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The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we
analyze the stability of international R&D networks. In Section 4 we study the efficiency
of international R&D collaboration, and we comment on the conflict between stability and
4
Yi and Shin (2000) have analyzed the endogenous formation of research coalitions where coalition
formation is modelled in terms of a coalition structure, which is a partition of the set of firms. But the
restriction to partitions is a strong one indeed if our interest is in research collaborations, since it rules out
situations in which, for example, firms 1 and 2 have a bilateral research agreement and firms 2 and 3 have
a similar agreement but there is no agreement between 1 and 3. When this occurs, it is not appropriate
to view firms 1, 2 and 3 as one coalition, and we cannot think of 1 and 2 and 2 and 3 being two distinct
coalitions, since this violates the mutual exclusiveness property of coalitions. The theory of networks
provides a natural way to think of such issues, since it allows for such intransitive relationships.
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efficiency of networks. In Section 5 we conclude.
2 The model
The model is similar to Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) except that we consider R&D
subsidies. There are three firms located in three different countries. The firms produce
homogeneous goods and, as is standard in strategic trade policy models, it is assumed that
all firms compete in a fourth country’s market by setting quantity (Cournot competition).
This allows us to examine only firm profits when analyzing welfare. We denote by N =
{1, 2, 3} the set of firms which are connected in a network of R&D collaboration. Let
q
i
denote the quantities of the good produced by firm i ∈ N . Let P(Q) = a − Q be
the market-clearing price when aggregate quantity on the market is Q ≡
∑
i∈N
q
i
. More
precisely, P (Q) = a − Q for Q < a, and P(Q) = 0 otherwise, with a > 0. The firms can
undertake R&D to look for cost reducing innovations. Moreover, the firms may engage
in bilateral R&D collaboration. Finally, the government in each country, whose objective
is to maximize welfare, has an R&D policy toward its firm’s R&D activity. We consider
R&D tax or subsidy proportional to the firm’s R&D expenditure. Let s
i
be country i’s
R&D subsidy (tax if negative) rate.
In a network, firms are the nodes and each link indicates a pairwise R&D collaboration.
Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pair of firms are linked to each other. If we are
considering a pair of firms i and j, then {i, j} ∈ g indicates that i and j are linked under
the network g and that a R&D collaboration is established between firms i and j. For
simplicity, write ij to represent the link {i, j}, so ij ∈ g indicates that i and j are linked
under the network g. The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g
is denoted g + ij and the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network
g is denoted g − ij. For any network g, let N(g) = {i ∈ N | ∃ j such that ij ∈ g} be
the set of firms which have at least one link in the network g. Two firms i and j are
connected if and only if there exists a sequence of firms i
1
, ..., i
K
such that i
k
i
k+1
∈ g for
each k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1} with i
1
= i and i
K
= j. Let N
i
(g) be the set of firms with which
firm i has a collaboration link. Let G be the set of all possible networks. In this three-firm
market, there are four possible network architectures: (i) the complete network, g
c
, in
which every pair of firms is linked, (ii) the star network, g
s
, in which there is one firm that
is linked to the other two firms, (iii) the partially connected network, g
p
, in which two
firms have a link and the third firm is isolated, and (iv) the empty network, g
e
, in which
there are no collaboration links. In the star network, the firm which is linked to the other
two firms is called the "hub" firm, while the other two firms are called the "spoke" firms.
Given a network g, every firm i chooses an R&D effort level x
i
unilaterally. This effort
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Figure 1: Four possible network architectures.
helps lower its own marginal cost of production. Given a network g and the collection of
research outputs {x
i
}
i∈N
, the marginal cost of production for each firm i ∈ N becomes
c
i
(g) = c− x
i
−
∑
k∈N
i
(g)
x
k
− φ
∑
l /∈N
i
(g)
x
l
. (1)
Let
X
i
≡ x
i
+
∑
k∈N
i
(g)
x
k
+ φ
∑
l /∈N
i
(g)
x
l
(2)
be the total cost reduction for firm i obtained from its own research, x
i
, from the research
knowledge of firms that have a collaborative link with i which is fully absorbed, and from
the research knowledge of firms that do not have a collaborative link with i which is
partially absorbed depending on the spillover parameter φ ∈ [0, 1). We refer to this total
cost reduction, X
i
, as effective R&D output of firm i. Then, c
i
(g) = c−X
i
. We assume
that R&D effort is costly. Given a level x
i
∈ [0, c] of effort, the cost of effort is y(x
i
) = γx
2
i
,
γ > 0. We assume γ = 1 which suffices to ensure nonnegativity of all variables.
Thus, the profits of firm i ∈ N in a collaboration network g are given by
Π
i
(g) =


a− q
i
(g)−
∑
j =i
q
j
(g)− c
i
(g)


q
i
(g)− (1− s
i
) [x
i
(g)]
2
. (3)
For any network g, social welfare in each country i is defined as the profits of firm i
minus the R&D subsidies. The objective function of each government is its social welfare.
Let W
i
(g) denote social welfare of country i in network g.
W
i
(g) = Π
i
(g)− s
i
[x
i
(g)]
2
. (4)
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LetW (g) =
∑
i∈N
W
i
(g). We also define a concept of global social welfare, which is defined
by the sum of producing country’s welfare and importing country’s consumer surplus:
V (g) =
∑
i
W
i
(g) +
Q
2
2
.
We describe the interaction between the firms and governments using a four-stage
game. In the first stage, firms form pairwise collaboration links. In the second stage
each government simultaneously announces its R&D subsidy (tax if negative) rates. In
the third stage, each firm chooses independently a level of effort in R&D. In the fourth
stage, firms compete in the product market of a fourth country by setting quantities. This
multi-stage game is solved by backward induction.
Once we allow the government to subsidize R&D and to choose the subsidy rate (so
adding a fourth stage to Goyal and Moraga-González’ model), the solution of the whole
game becomes much more complex, especially when we are solving for the asymmetric
networks (partially connected and star networks). As a consequence, we cannot obtain
closed-form solutions for the asymmetric networks when subsidies are allowed and endoge-
nous. However, for each possible given value of public spillovers we are able to compute
the equilibrium solution. Thus, we propose to focus on four different cases with respect
to public spillovers φ: (i) no spillovers, φ = 0, (ii) weak spillovers, φ =
1
4
, (iii) medium
spillovers φ =
1
2
, (iv) strong spillovers, φ =
3
4
; and we will analyze numerically the general
case where φ ∈ [0,
1
2
] and we will show that the results obtained for the four different cases
do not hide any irregularities.
3 Stability of international R&D networks
3.1 Pairwise and strong stability
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run
is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents do not benefit from altering
the structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability
notion defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no agent
benefits from severing one of their links and no other two agents benefit from adding a
link between them, with one benefiting strictly and the other at least weakly.
Definition 1 A network g is pairwise stable if
• for all ij ∈ g, Π
i
(g) ≥ Π
i
(g − ij) and Π
j
(g) ≥ Π
j
(g − ij), and
• for all ij /∈ g, if Π
i
(g) < Π
i
(g + ij) then Π
j
(g) > Π
j
(g + ij).
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Let us say that g
′
is adjacent to g if g
′
= g + ij or g
′
= g − ij for some ij. A network
g
′
defeats g if either g
′
= g − ij and Π
i
(g
′
) ≥ Π
i
(g), or if g
′
= g + ij with Π
i
(g
′
) ≥ Π
i
(g)
and Π
j
(g
′
) ≥ Π
j
(g) with at least one inequality holding strictly. Pairwise stability is
equivalent to saying that a network is pairwise stable if it is not defeated by another
(necessarily adjacent) network. This definition of stability is quite weak and should be
seen as a necessary condition for strategic stability.
While pairwise stability is natural and quite easy to work with, there are some limi-
tations of the concept. First, it is a weak notion in that it only considers deviations on
a single link at a time. For instance, it could be that an agent would not benefit from
severing any single link but would benefit from severing several links simultaneously, and
yet the network would still be pairwise stable. Second, pairwise stability considers only
deviations by at most a pair of agents at a time. It might be that some group of agents
could all be made better off by some complicated reorganization of their links, which is not
accounted for under pairwise stability. The definition of strong stable networks is in that
spirit, and is due to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2004). A strongly stable network is
a network which is stable against changes in links by any coalition of agents.
A network g
′
∈ G is obtainable from g ∈ G via deviations by S if
(i) ij ∈ g
′
and ij /∈ g implies ij ⊂ S, and
(ii) ij ∈ g and ij /∈ g
′
implies ij ∩ S = ∅.
The above definition identifies changes in a network that can be made by a coalition
S, without the need of consent of any agents outside of S. Part (i) requires that any new
links that are added can only be between agents in S. This reflects the fact that consent
of both agents is needed to add a link. Part (ii) requires that at least one agent of any
deleted link be in S. This reflects the fact that either agent in a link can unilaterally sever
the relationship.
Definition 2 A network g is strongly stable if for any S ⊂ N, g
′
that is obtainable from
g via deviations by S, and i ∈ S such that Π
i
(g
′
) > Π
i
(g), there exists j ∈ S such that
Π
j
(g
′
) < Π
j
(g).
Strong stability provides a powerful refinement of pairwise stability. The concept of
strong stability mainly makes sense in smaller network situations where agents have sub-
stantial information about the overall structure and potential payoffs and can coordinate
their actions. That is, it makes sense to model agreements between firms in an oligopoly.
We are interested in the networks of international R&D collaboration that emerge in
two different settings: with subsidies or without subsidies (s
i
= 0); and in four different
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situations: (i) no spillovers, φ = 0, (ii) weak spillovers, φ =
1
4
, (iii) medium spillovers
φ =
1
2
, (iv) strong spillovers, φ =
3
4
.
3.2 Stable R&D networks without subsidies
In order to characterize the strongly stable R&D networks we first derive the pairwise
stable networks since a strongly stable network is pairwise stable while the reverse is not
true. From Goyal and Moraga-González (2001), if there are no subsidies, the profits of
the firm at equilibrium are given in Table 1 (see also the appendix). The next proposition
is a corollary of Proposition 9 in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) whose proof is given
for completeness.
g
c
g
s
g
p
g
e
φ = 0 Π
i
.089 (a− c)
2
.161 (a− c)
2
.188 (a− c)
2
.042 (a− c)
2
Π
j
.089 (a− c)
2
.057 (a− c)
2
0 .042 (a− c)
2
φ =
1
4
Π
i
.089 (a− c)
2
.139 (a− c)
2
.113 (a− c)
2
.065 (a− c)
2
Π
j
.089 (a− c)
2
.068 (a− c)
2
.036 (a− c)
2
.065 (a− c)
2
φ =
1
2
Π
i
.089 (a− c)
2
.119 (a− c)
2
.104 (a− c)
2
.083 (a− c)
2
Π
j
.089 (a− c)
2
.078 (a− c)
2
.063 (a− c)
2
.083 (a− c)
2
φ =
3
4
Π
i
.089 (a− c)
2
.103 (a− c)
2
.097 (a− c)
2
.092 (a− c)
2
Π
j
.089 (a− c)
2
.085 (a− c)
2
.081 (a− c)
2
.092 (a− c)
2
Table 1: Firm’s profits when governments cannot subsidize R&D.
Proposition 1 Suppose that governments cannot subsidize research and development. (i)
The complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable, (ii) the partially connected network g
p
is pairwise stable only if there are no public spillovers (φ = 0), (iii) the star and empty
networks (respectively, g
s
and g
e
) are never pairwise stable.
Proof. First we show that the complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable. No pair
of firms k and j have incentives to delete their link kj ∈ g
c
. From Table 1 we have
Π
∗
k
(g
c
) > Π
∗
k
(g
s
) and Π
∗
j
(g
c
) > Π
∗
j
(g
s
) with kj /∈ g
s
. Thus, g
c
is pairwise stable. Obvi-
ously, the star network g
s
cannot be pairwise stable since firms k and j have incentives to
form the link kj /∈ g
s
. Second, the empty network g
e
is never pairwise stable because we
have Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
e
) and Π
∗
k
(g
p
) > Π
∗
k
(g
e
) with ik ∈ g
p
. Third, since the empty network
is never pairwise stable, the network g
p
is pairwise stable if and only if Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
s
)
or Π
∗
j
(g
p
) > Π
∗
j
(g
s
) with ij /∈ g
p
, ij ∈ g
s
, and j /∈ N(g
p
). From Table 1 the partially
connected network g
p
is pairwise stable only if there are no public spillovers (φ = 0).
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Network structures are more important when public spillovers are modest. When there
are no public spillovers (φ = 0), the partially connected network is pairwise stable. The
isolated firm has a significant cost disadvantage and is driven out of the market. However,
public spillovers destabilize the partially connected network. The intuition behind this
remark is that the stability of the partially connected network relies on the great asym-
metry existing between the linked firms and the isolated firm. It is this asymmetry that
discourages a linked firm from forming a link with the isolated firm when public spillovers
are absent. As spillovers are weak, medium or strong, this asymmetry reduces, and that
destabilizes the partially connected network.
Proposition 2 Suppose that governments cannot subsidize research and development.
The partially connected network g
p
is the unique strongly stable network if and only if
there are no public spillovers (φ = 0). Otherwise, no network g ∈ G is strongly stable.
Proof. First, since strong stability is a refinement of pairwise stability, we have that the
empty and star networks are never strongly stable. Second, we show that the complete
network g
c
is never strongly stable. Indeed, from Table 1 we have Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
c
) and
Π
∗
k
(g
p
) > Π
∗
k
(g
c
) with ik ∈ g
p
. Third, from Proposition 1 we know that the partially
connected network is not pairwise stable if either public spillovers are weak, medium or
strong; and so is not strongly stable. But, if there are no public spillovers (φ = 0), then g
p
is pairwise stable. Is g
p
strongly stable too? Since g
p
is pairwise stable, it suffices to show
that no coalition has incentives to add links to form the complete network g
c
. The answer
is no since Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
c
) and Π
∗
k
(g
p
) > Π
∗
k
(g
c
) with ik ∈ g
p
as shown above. Thus,
if there are no public spillovers (φ = 0), then g
p
is the unique strongly stable network;
otherwise no network is strongly stable.
Since a strongly stable network is a pairwise stable network, the only two candidates
to be strongly stable are g
p
and g
c
when governments cannot subsidize R&D. We observe
that in the four cases (φ = 0, φ =
1
4
, φ =
1
2
, φ =
3
4
) the complete network g
c
is never
strongly stable because two firms have incentives to form a coalition and to delete their
links with the third firm; so moving to the partially connected network g
p
. Thus, g
p
is
strongly stable if there are no public spillovers (φ = 0), and it is the unique one. Otherwise,
no network g ∈ G is strongly stable.
Whenever no network is strongly stable we will observe a sequence of R&D networks
due to continuously profitable deviations. In terms of competition policy, it would be
interesting to know which networks are likely to be visited by such sequence of profitable
deviations. In fact we will show that some R&D networks will be visited at most once,
while others will belong to a closed cycle and will be visited regularly. We now define what
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is meant by a closed cycle. A network g
′
strongly defeats g if (i) g
′
is obtainable from g
via deviations by S ⊂ N and (ii) Π
i
(g
′
) ≥ Π
i
(g) for all i ∈ S and Π
j
(g
′
) > Π
j
(g) for some
j ∈ S. An improving path from a network g to a network g
′
is a finite sequence of graphs
g
1
, g
2
, ..., g
K
with g
1
= g and g
K
= g
′
such that for any k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1} we have g
k+1
strongly defeats g
k
. A set of networks G form a cycle if for any g ∈ G and g
′
∈ G there
exists an improving path connecting g to g
′
. A cycle G is a closed cycle if no network in G
lies on an improving path leading to a network that is not in G. The characterization of
the closed cycles follows immediately from the proofs of pairwise and strong stable R&D
networks. When no strongly stable network exists we will observe a unique closed cycle of
R&D networks where the star network will succeed to the partially connected network, the
complete network will succeed to the star network, and the partially connected network
will succeed to the complete network. The empty network which is the only network
outside the closed cycle will be visited at most once. In fact, it will be visited only if it is
the initial network.
Figure 2: Profits of each firm when governments cannot subsidize R&D.
We would like to examine more deeply the relation between stable networks and public
spillovers; that is, for φ ∈ [0,
1
2
]. The equilibrium values of the profits in the different
networks are given in the appendix and are plotted (for a − c = 1) in Figure 2. Using
Figure 2 we can study the stability of different networks with respect to public spillovers
when governments cannot subsidize R&D as in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001). The
complete network g
c
is pairwise stable for all φ ∈ [0,
1
2
], while the partially connected
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network g
p
is pairwise stable for φ ∈ [0, φ] where φ  0.04 is the solution to equation
Π
i
(g
s
) = Π
i
(g
p
) with firm i being a hub in g
s
and a linked firm in g
p
. The star network
and the empty network are never pairwise stable. As already mentioned, greater spillovers
destabilize the partially connected network rapidly. We have that the complete network g
c
is never strongly stable because two firms have incentives to form a coalition and to delete
their links with the third firm; so moving to the partially connected network g
p
. Thus,
g
p
is strongly stable if φ ≤ φ where φ  0.04 is the solution to equation Π
i
(g
s
) = Π
i
(g
p
)
with firm i being a hub in g
s
and a linked firm in g
p
. So, if φ ≤ φ  0.04 the partially
connected network g
p
is the unique strongly stable network; otherwise, no network g ∈ G
is strongly stable (a formal proof is given in the appendix).
3.3 Stable R&D networks with subsidies
Whenever governments can subsidize R&D, the subsidies and profits of the firm at equi-
librium are given in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. Some observations are made: (i)
in the complete network g
c
, the equilibrium subsidy rate does not depend on the public
spillovers; (ii) in the star network g
s
, the equilibrium subsidy rates are decreasing with
the public spillovers; (iii) in the empty network g
e
, the subsidy rate first decreases with
public spillovers, then it increases with spillovers; (iv) in the partially connected network
g
p
, there is a continuum of optimal subsidy rates for the government of the isolated firm
when there are no public spillovers. The reason is that the governments of the linked firms
do not need to subsidize R&D to keep the isolated firm out of the market. Thus, the
continuum of optimal subsidy rates for the government of the isolated firm are the levels
of subsidies such that the isolated firm does not find profitable to produce. For instance,
if s
j
> 1.375 then it would be profitable to produce and to enter the market. However,
the welfare of the country of the isolated firm would be negative.
g
c
g
s
g
p
g
e
φ = 0 s
i
.146 .5 0 .25
s
j
.146 .5 [0, 1.375] .25
φ =
1
4
s
i
.146 .181 .344 .046
s
j
.146 .334 .406 .046
φ =
1
2
s
i
.146 .132 .169 0
s
j
.146 .257 0 0
φ =
3
4
s
i
.146 .086 .019 .039
s
j
.146 .197 .122 .039
Table 2: Governments R&D subsidy rates.
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gc
g
s
g
p
g
e
φ = 0 Π
i
.095 (a− c)
2
.389 (a− c)
2
.188 (a− c)
2
.028 (a− c)
2
Π
j
.095 (a− c)
2
.056 (a− c)
2
0 .028 (a− c)
2
φ =
1
4
Π
i
.095 (a− c)
2
.173 (a− c)
2
.255 (a− c)
2
.065 (a− c)
2
Π
j
.095 (a− c)
2
.075 (a− c)
2
0 .065 (a− c)
2
φ =
1
2
Π
i
.095 (a− c)
2
.132 (a− c)
2
.119 (a− c)
2
.083 (a− c)
2
Π
j
.095 (a− c)
2
.084 (a− c)
2
.057 (a− c)
2
.083 (a− c)
2
φ =
3
4
Π
i
.095 (a− c)
2
.110 (a− c)
2
.103 (a− c)
2
.093 (a− c)
2
Π
j
.095 (a− c)
2
.090 (a− c)
2
.082 (a− c)
2
.093 (a− c)
2
Table 3: Firm’s profits when governments can subsidize R&D.
Comparing Table 1 with Table 3 we observe that allowing governments to subsidize
R&D does not necessarily increase firms’ profits, except in the complete network g
c
. For
instance, in the empty network g
e
without public spillovers, subsidies will push firms to
overinvest even more in R&D in order to gain market shares from their rivals.
5
In the
complete networks g
c
, this effect is absent because each firm benefits entirely from the
R&D effort of each other firm. We now study pairwise and strongly stable networks when
governments can subsidize R&D.
Proposition 3 Suppose that governments can subsidize research and development. (i)
The complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable, (ii) the partially connected network g
p
is pairwise stable if only if there are weak public spillovers (φ =
1
4
), (iii) the star and
empty networks (respectively, g
s
and g
e
) are never pairwise stable.
Proof. First we show that the complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable. No pair
of firms k and j have incentives to delete their link kj ∈ g
c
. From Table 3 we have
Π
∗
k
(g
c
) > Π
∗
k
(g
s
) and Π
∗
j
(g
c
) > Π
∗
j
(g
s
) with kj /∈ g
s
. Thus, g
c
is pairwise stable. Obvi-
ously, the star network g
s
cannot be pairwise stable since firms k and j have incentives to
form the link kj /∈ g
s
. Second, the empty network g
e
is never pairwise stable because we
have Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
e
) and Π
∗
k
(g
p
) > Π
∗
k
(g
e
) with ik ∈ g
p
. Third, since the empty network
is never pairwise stable, the network g
p
is pairwise stable if and only if Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
s
)
or Π
∗
j
(g
p
) > Π
∗
j
(g
s
) with ij /∈ g
p
, ij ∈ g
s
, and j /∈ N(g
p
). From Table 3 the partially
connected network g
p
is pairwise stable only if there are weak public spillovers (φ =
1
4
).
5
An R&D subsidy by the "domestic" government enhances the firm’s cost advantage through discour-
aging the "foreign" rival’s R&D investment, which in turn enables the "domestic" firm to snatch a larger
market share at the expense of the other "foreign" firms.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that governments can subsidize research and development. The
partially connected network g
p
is the unique strongly stable network if and only if there are
weak public spillovers (φ =
1
4
). Otherwise, no network g ∈ G is strongly stable.
Proof. First, since strong stability is a refinement of pairwise stability, we have that the
empty and star networks are never strongly stable. Second, we show that the complete
network g
c
is never strongly stable. Indeed, from Table 3 we have Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
c
) and
Π
∗
k
(g
p
) > Π
∗
k
(g
c
) with ik ∈ g
p
. Third, from Proposition 3 we know that the partially
connected network is not pairwise stable if either public spillovers are absent, medium or
strong; and so is not strongly stable. But, if there are weak public spillovers (φ =
1
4
), then
g
p
is pairwise stable. Is g
p
strongly stable too? Since g
p
is pairwise stable, it suffices to
show that no coalition has incentives to add links to form the complete network g
c
. The
answer is no since Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
c
) and Π
∗
k
(g
p
) > Π
∗
k
(g
c
) with ik ∈ g
p
as shown above.
Thus, if there are weak public spillovers (φ =
1
4
), then g
p
is the unique strongly stable
network; otherwise no network is strongly stable.
We observe again that the complete network g
c
is never strongly stable because two
firms have incentives to move to the partially connected network g
p
by deleting their link
with the third firm. Thus, g
p
is strongly stable for φ =
1
4
; otherwise, no network is strongly
stable. When no network is strongly stable we will observe a sequence of R&D networks due
to continuously profitable deviations. In fact, we will again observe a unique closed cycle of
R&D networks where the star network will succeed to the partially connected network, the
complete network will succeed to the star network, and the partially connected network
will succeed to the complete network.
Once we allow the government to subsidize R&D and to choose the subsidy rate, the
solution of the whole game becomes much more complex, especially when we are solving
for the partially connected and star networks; and, we cannot obtain closed-form solutions
for those asymmetric networks. However, we can analyze numerically the general case
where φ ∈ [0,
1
2
]. The equilibrium values (for a − c = 1) of the profits in the different
networks are plotted in Figure 3. Using Figure 3 we observe that the complete network g
c
is pairwise stable for all φ ∈ [0,
1
2
]. The profits of the hub firm in the star network g
s
are
still decreasing with φ. But, the profits of a linked firm in the partially connected network
g
p
are now first increasing with φ until it becomes profitable for the isolated firm to enter
the market, then the profits start to decrease with φ. As a consequence, we have that the
partially connected network g
p
is pairwise stable when φ is not too small nor too large.
Precisely, g
p
is pairwise stable for φ ∈ [φ,φ] where φ  0.125 and φ  0.36 are the solutions
to the equation Π
i
(g
s
) = Π
i
(g
p
) with firm i being a hub in g
s
and a linked firm in g
p
. The
13
Figure 3: Profits of each firm when governments can subsidize R&D.
star network and the empty network are never pairwise stable. With respect to strong
stability, we observe again that the complete network g
c
is never strongly stable because
two firms have incentives to move to the partially connected network g
p
by deleting their
link with the third firm. Thus, g
p
is strongly stable for φ ∈ [φ,φ] where φ  0.125 and
φ  0.36 are the solutions to the equation Π
i
(g
s
) = Π
i
(g
p
) with firm i being a hub in g
s
and a linked firm in g
p
. So, if φ ∈ [φ,φ] the partially connected network g
p
is the unique
strongly stable network. Otherwise, no network g ∈ G is strongly stable.
We now provide some intuition for the fact that, once governments can subsidize R&D,
the partially connected network g
p
is no more stable for very small public spillovers. For
very small spillovers we have: (i) Π
i
(g
s
) < Π
i
(g
p
) when governments cannot subsidize
and (ii) Π
i
(g
s
) > Π
i
(g
p
) when governments can subsidize, with i being a hub in g
s
and
a linked firm in g
p
. Subsidies have a double effect on the profits of linked firms in the
partially connected network g
p
. First, there is a bigger overinvestment in R&D due to
subsidies that implies a stronger competition between the two linked firms and tends to
reduce profits. Second, there is a cost advantage for the linked firms with respect to the
isolated firm that tends to increase profits. The first effect (which is much weaker when
government cannot subsidize) dominates the second effect for low values of spillovers when
government can subsidize R&D. Notice that overinvestment in R&D is decreasing with φ.
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4 Efficiency of international R&D networks
In evaluating societal welfare, we may take various perspectives. A network g is Pareto
efficient if there does not exist any g
′
⊂ G such that W
i
(g
′
) ≥ W
i
(g) for each country i
with strict inequality for some country i. This definition of efficiency of a network can be
thought of as applying to situations where no intervention is possible. A network g ⊂ G
is strongly efficient if W (g) =
∑
i
W
i
(g) ≥
∑
i
W
i
(g
′
) = W (g
′
) for all g
′
⊂ G. This is a
strong notion of efficiency as it takes the perspective that value is fully transferable.
If there are no subsidies, the social welfare of each country at equilibrium is simply the
profit of its firm. Thus, social welfare of each country at equilibrium is given in Table 1
and some observations can be made. Suppose that governments cannot subsidize research
and development:
(i) The partially connected network g
p
is the strongly efficient network if and only if
public spillovers are absent (φ = 0) or weak (φ =
1
4
) or strong (φ =
3
4
). Otherwise,
the star network g
s
is the strongly efficient network (i.e. for φ =
1
2
).
(ii) The partially connected network g
p
and the star network g
s
are always Pareto effi-
cient, the complete network g
c
is always Pareto efficient except if public spillovers are
strong (φ =
3
4
), and the empty network g
e
is Pareto efficient only if public spillovers
are strong (φ =
3
4
).
Once governments can subsidize R&D, the equilibrium social welfare of each country
is given in Table 4 and some observations can be made. Suppose that governments can
subsidize research and development:
(i) The partially connected network g
p
is the strongly efficient network if and only if
public spillovers are absent (φ = 0) or weak (φ =
1
4
), and the star network g
s
is
the strongly efficient network if and only if public spillovers are medium (φ =
1
2
) or
strong (φ =
3
4
).
(ii) The partially connected network g
p
and the star network g
s
are always Pareto effi-
cient, the complete network g
c
is always Pareto efficient except if public spillovers are
strong (φ =
3
4
), and the empty network g
e
is Pareto efficient only if public spillovers
are strong (φ =
3
4
).
A question we would like to answer is whether allowing for subsidies is superior in
terms of societal welfare. In order to answer this question we compare the societal welfare
levels of the different pairwise stable networks when governments cannot subsidize R&D
15
gc
g
s
g
p
g
e
φ = 0 W
i
.094 (a− c)
2
.333 (a− c)
2
.188 (a− c)
2
0
W
j
.094 (a− c)
2
0 0 0
φ =
1
4
W
i
.094 (a− c)
2
.164 (a− c)
2
.200 (a− c)
2
.063 (a− c)
2
W
j
.094 (a− c)
2
.070 (a− c)
2
0 .063 (a− c)
2
φ =
1
2
W
i
.094 (a− c)
2
.128 (a− c)
2
.114 (a− c)
2
.083 (a− c)
2
W
j
.094 (a− c)
2
.082 (a− c)
2
.057 (a− c)
2
.083 (a− c)
2
φ =
3
4
W
i
.094 (a− c)
2
.107 (a− c)
2
.101 (a− c)
2
.093 (a− c)
2
W
j
.094 (a− c)
2
.089 (a− c)
2
.082 (a− c)
2
.093 (a− c)
2
Table 4: Social welfare of each country when governments can subsidize R&D.
and when governments can do it. Using Table 1 and Table 4, as well as the results on
pairwise stable networks, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Except if there are no public spillovers (φ = 0), societal welfare is higher
when governments can subsidize research and development.
From the above observations we have that a conflict between stability and strong
efficiency may occur when governments cannot subsidize R&D as well as when they can
do it. When governments cannot subsidize R&D, the conflict will occur except if spillovers
are absent (φ = 0). When governments can subsidize R&D, the conflict will occur except
if spillovers are weak (φ =
1
4
). Thus, a conflict is likely to arise but we do not know
whether it is more likely when governments can subsidize or when governments cannot.
Regarding the general case φ ∈ [0,
1
2
], the equilibrium values (for a − c = 1) of the
societal welfare in the different networks are plotted in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Remember
that societal welfare is simply the sum of the welfare of producing countries. When
governments are not allowed to subsidize R&D (see Figure 4), the partially connected
network g
p
is the strongly efficient network for φ ∈ [0,
̂
φ] where
̂
φ  0.113 is the solution
to equation W (g
s
) = W (g
p
). For φ ∈ [
̂
φ,
1
2
], the star network g
s
is the strongly efficient
network. When governments can subsidize R&D (see Figure 5), the partially connected
network g
p
is the strongly efficient network for φ ∈ [0,
̂
φ] where
̂
φ  0.375 is the solution
to equation W (g
s
) = W (g
p
). For φ ∈ [
̂
φ,
1
2
], the star network g
s
is the strongly efficient
network.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 contrast the strongly efficient and stable networks with respect
to public spillovers. We observe that, when governments cannot subsidize R&D, the
likelihood of a conflict is 92%. This conflict will arise if spillovers are not very small.
However, when governments can subsidize R&D, the likelihood of a conflict is considerably
16
Figure 4: Societal welfare when government cannot subsidize R&D.
reduced to 53%. Indeed, a conflict will arise "only" if spillovers are very small or quite
large. Notice that the same conflict exists if we consider the global welfare (which includes
the consumer surplus of the fourth country) instead of the sum of the welfare of producing
countries (see Figure 9 and Figure 11 of the appendix).
Finally, using Figure 4 and Figure 5 (and the results on pairwise stable networks),
we compare the societal welfare levels of the different pairwise stable networks when gov-
ernments cannot subsidize R&D and when governments can do it, and we confirm that,
except if public spillovers are very small (φ ≤ 0.04), one should definitely allow for R&D
subsidies. As public spillovers grows, it becomes always superior to allow governments to
subsidize R&D.
5 Conclusion
It has become increasingly prevalent that rival firms of different countries engage in R&D
collaboration. Thus, it is important to understand how government policies affect the
stability and efficiency of international R&D collaboration networks. We have shown that
a conflict between stability and efficiency is likely to occur. When governments cannot
subsidize R&D, this conflict occurs if public spillovers are not too small. However, when
governments can subsidize R&D, the likelihood of a conflict is considerably reduced. In-
deed, a conflict arises only if public spillovers are very small or quite large.
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Figure 5: Societal welfare when government can subsidize R&D.
   
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φ
Figure 6: The conflict between stability and strong efficiency without R&D subsidies.
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Figure 7: The conflict between stability and strong efficiency with R&D subsidies.
Appendix A: Networks without subsidies
From Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) we have that, in the complete network g
c
,
the equilibrium effort, effective R&D output, quantity, and profits are given by
x
∗
i
(g
c
) =
a− c
13
; X
∗
i
(g
c
) =
3(a− c)
13
; q
∗
i
(g
c
) =
4(a− c)
13
; Π
∗
i
(g
c
) =
15(a − c)
2
169
.
Consider the star network g
s
and let firm i be the hub and firm j be a spoke. Then, the
equilibrium effort levels of the different firms are
x
∗
j
(g
s
) =
4(a− c)(2− φ)
7φ
2
− 13φ+ 58
; x
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(a − c)(φ
2
− 3φ+ 6)
7φ
2
− 13φ+ 58
.
and the effective R&D outputs are
X
∗
j
(g
s
) =
(a− c)(14 + φ− 3φ
2
)
7φ
2
− 13φ+ 58
; X
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(a− c)(22 + (−11 + φ)φ)
7φ
2
− 13φ+ 58
.
The equilibrium quantities and profits are
q
∗
j
(g
s
) =
16(a− c)
7φ
2
− 13φ+ 58
; Π
∗
j
(g
s
) =
16(a− c)
2
(12− φ
2
+ 4φ)
(7φ
2
− 13φ + 58)
2
;
q
∗
i
(g
s
) =
4(a− c)(φ
2
− 3φ+ 6)
7φ
2
− 13φ+ 58
; Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
15(a− c)
2
(φ
2
− 3φ+ 6)
2
(7φ
2
− 13φ + 58)
2
.
Consider the partially connected network g
p
and let firms i and k be the linked firms and
firm j be the isolated firm. Then, the equilibrium effort levels of the different firms are
x
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(a− c)(2 + 9φ− 9φ
2
+ 2φ
3
)
2(4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
)
; x
∗
j
(g
p
) =
φ(a− c)(9− 9φ+ 2φ
2
)
4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
.
and the effective R&D outputs are
X
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(a− c)(2 + 9φ− 7φ
3
+ 2φ
4
)
2(4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
)
; X
∗
j
(g
p
) =
φ(a− c)(11 + φ
2
(−7 + 2φ))
4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
.
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The equilibrium quantities and profits are
q
∗
i
(g
p
) =
2(a− c)(1 + 5φ− 2φ
2
)
4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
; Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(a − c)
2
(1 + 5φ− 2φ
2
)
2
(12− φ
2
+ 4φ)
4(4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
)
2
;
q
∗
j
(g
p
) =
4(a− c)φ(3− φ)
4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
; Π
∗
j
(g
p
) =
(a − c)
2
φ
2
(3− φ)
2
(7 + 12φ− 4φ
2
)
(4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
)
2
.
In the empty network g
e
, the equilibrium effort, effective R&D output, quantity, and
profits are given by
x
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(a− c)(3− 2φ)
13− 4φ+ 4φ
2
; X
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(a− c)(3− 2φ)(1 + 2φ)
13− 4φ + 4φ
2
;
q
∗
i
(g
e
) =
4(a− c)
13− 4φ+ 4φ
2
; Π
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(a− c)
2
(7 + 12φ − 4φ
2
)
(13− 4φ+ 4φ
2
)
2
.
The societal welfare under the different networks is given by W (g) =
∑
i∈N
W
i
(g) =
∑
i∈N
Π
i
(g). The global welfare is given by V (g) which is simply
∑
i
Π
i
(g) +
Q
2
2
. Then,
we have
V
∗
(g
c
) =
9(a − c)
2
13
; V
∗
(g
s
) =
(a− c)
2
(2492− 1084φ+ 579φ
2
− 138φ
3
+ 23φ
4
)
(7φ
2
− 13φ+ 58)
2
;
V
∗
(g
p
) =
(a− c)
2
(28 + 380φ+ 1345φ
2
− 802φ
3
− 111φ
4
+ 108φ
5
− 12φ
6
)
2(4 + 33φ− 16φ
2
+ 7φ
3
− 2φ
4
)
2
;
V
∗
(g
e
) =
3(a − c)
2
(31 + 12φ− 4φ
2
)
(13− 4φ+ 4φ
2
)
2
.
Proposition 6 (Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001) Suppose that governments can-
not subsidize research and development and φ ∈ [0, 1]. The complete network g
c
is pair-
wise stable for all φ ∈ [0, 1], while the partially connected network g
p
is pairwise stable for
φ ∈ [0, φ] where φ  0.04 is the solution to equation Π
i
(g
s
) = Π
i
(g
p
) with firm i being
a hub in g
s
and a linked firm in g
p
. The star network and the empty network are never
pairwise stable.
Proposition 7 Suppose that governments cannot subsidize research and development and
φ ∈ [0, 1]. The partially connected network g
p
is the unique strongly stable network for
φ ∈ [0, φ] where φ  0.04 is the solution to equation Π
i
(g
s
) = Π
i
(g
p
) with firm i being a
hub in g
s
and a linked firm in g
p
. The complete network, the star network and the empty
network are never strongly stable.
Proof. First, since strong stability is a refinement of pairwise stability, we have that
the empty and star networks are never strongly stable. Second, we show that the com-
plete network g
c
is never strongly stable. Indeed, from we have Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
c
) and
Π
∗
k
(g
p
) > Π
∗
k
(g
c
) with ik ∈ g
p
. Third, from Proposition 6 we know that the partially
20
connected network is not pairwise stable if φ > φ  0.04; and so is not strongly stable.
But, if φ ∈ [0, φ], then g
p
is pairwise stable. Is g
p
strongly stable too? Since g
p
is pairwise
stable, it suffices to show that no coalition has incentives to add links to form the complete
network g
c
. The answer is no since Π
∗
i
(g
p
) > Π
∗
i
(g
c
) and Π
∗
k
(g
p
) > Π
∗
k
(g
c
) with ik ∈ g
p
.
Thus, if φ ∈ [0, φ], then g
p
is the unique strongly stable network; otherwise no network is
strongly stable.
In Figure 8 and Figure 9 we have plotted, respectively, the effective R&D outputs and
the global welfare for each possible network whenever governments cannot subsidize R&D.
Figure 8: Effective R&D when governments cannot subsidize R&D.
Appendix B: Networks with subsidies
Standard computations show that, in the complete network g
c
, the equilibrium subsidy,
effort, effective R&D output, quantity, and profits are given by
s
∗
i
(g
c
) = 0.146; x
∗
i
(g
c
) =
a− c
5 + 4
√
2
; X
∗
i
(g
c
) =
3(a− c)
5 + 4
√
2
; q
∗
i
(g
c
) =
(3
√
2− 2)(a− c)
7
;
Π
∗
i
(g
c
) =
(54− 25
√
2) (a− c)
2
196
.
The social welfare and global welfare are, respectively, given by
W
∗
i
(g
c
) =
(a− c)
2
5 + 4
√
2
; V
∗
(g
c
) =
6(5
√
2− 1) (a − c)
2
49
.
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Figure 9: Global welfare when governments cannot subsidize R&D.
Let A be given by A =
√
1 + φ(26 + φ(−19 + 4(−1 + φ)φ)). In the empty network g
e
, the
equilibrium subsidy, effort, effective R&D output, quantity, and profits are given by
s
∗
i
(g
e
) =
3− φ+ 2φ
2
−A
8
; x
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(a − c)(3− 2φ)
7− 2φ+ 2A
;
X
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(a− c)(3 + 4(1− φ)φ)
7− 2φ+ 2A
; q
∗
i
(g
e
) =
4(a− c)
11− 11φ+ 4φ
3
+ (1 + 2φ)A
;
Π
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(a− c)
2
(7 + 123φ− 66φ
2
− 44φ
3
+ 24φ
4
+ (11 + 4(4− 3φ)φ)A
8(7− 2φ+ 2A)
2
.
The social welfare and global welfare are, respectively, given by
W
∗
i
(g
e
) =
2(2− φ)φ (a− c)
2
3 + 18φ− 11φ
2
− 4φ
3
+ 4φ
4
+ (3 + φ(−1 + 2φ))A
;
V
∗
(g
e
) =
3(29 + 138φ − 111φ
2
− 20φ
3
+ 20φ
4
− 5(−5 + φ(−1 + 2φ))A) (a− c)
2
4(7− 2φ+ 2A)
2
.
Unfortunately, for the star network g
s
and the partially connected network g
p
we
cannot obtain closed-form solutions. However, for each possible given value of φ ∈ [0,
1
2
]
(public spillovers) we are able to compute the equilibrium solutions. The equilibrium
values (for a − c = 1) of the profits, the societal welfare, the effective R&D outputs and
the global welfare are plotted in Figure 3, Figure 5, Figure 10 and Figure 11, respectively.
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Figure 10: Effective R&D when governments can subsidize R&D.
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